IF one day is a long time in politics, so it is in diplomacy. The most striking example of this is the extraordinary speed with which the special relationship between the US and India has been unravelling. In February, the familiar warmth of what Narendra Modi described as a “mega-partnership” was on display during his visit to the White House. The Indian prime minister was the second world leader President Donald Trump hosted after his return to power. Both effusively praised each other, and Trump talked about his “special bond” with Modi.
Nevertheless, there were signs during the visit of the friction that lay ahead. Amid the hugs and handshakes, Trump criticised India for having some of the highest trade tariffs in the world. Hours before Modi’s visit, Trump announced reciprocal tariffs to match those levied by other countries on US goods. He also said India was “a hard place to do business in”. During the election campaign, he accused India of being “a very big abuser” of trade and made it plain that acting on tariffs would be his top priority.
These signs of impending trouble were either ignored or underestimated by New Delhi. Several rounds of trade negotiations that followed were marked by sharp differences, especially over US access to India’s highly protected agricultural and dairy sector. But the Indian side still expected to reach a deal with its biggest trading partner. Instead, Trump unleashed a barrage of threats and invectives against India, castigating it for its “obnoxious” trade practices. In social media posts on X, he assailed India often in harsh language. Then just ahead of his Aug 1 deadline to conclude trade deals on reciprocal tariffs, he announced imposition of a 25 per cent levy on Indian imports and an unspecified penalty for India’s purchase of Russian oil and arms. He also ruled out further talks until the tariff dispute was resolved.
This left the Modi government reeling in shock from the additional tariffs decision, which it described as unwarranted. Trump also threatened additional penalties on India for being part of BRICS, which he characterises as being anti-America. Trump then dubbed India — along with Russia — as “dead economies”. Claiming India’s oil imports from Russia were “fuelling the Ukraine war” and with trade talks deadlocked, he imposed additional 25pc tariffs as penalty, ratcheting them to 50pc. India is the second-largest importer of oil from Russia, after China. Over a third of India’s crude oil imports come from Russia.
Trump’s coercive tariff actions have left India in a quandary.
Within less than six months, the strategic partnership between the two countries had plunged into a serious crisis that was driving it towards a meltdown. How did things come to this pass? There has been much discussion in the international media and think-tank community with analysts raising the question of whether this is a temporary blip or a fundamental reordering of the relationship. Most of the analysis comes down on the side of the latter, given the structural sources of their differences in a shifting geopolitical environment.
New Delhi seems to have made three major miscalculations and misjudgements which framed its policy and led to mishandling of the situation. One, it failed to see that Trump’s overwhelming priority was trade and not strategic issues, such as India’s role in America’s containment of China, which New Delhi thought would shield it from divergences on tariffs. India’s hubris about its strategic importance for Washington, nurtured over the decades, blindsided Indian officials to the fallout of the tariff discord on the relationship. They also failed to recognise Trump’s use of tariffs as a tool in pursuit of geopolitical interests.
The second miscalculation relates to the India-Pakistan crisis in May and Trump’s repeated declarations he brought that conflict to an end. New Delhi vehemently denied the US played a role, which contradicted both Trump and reality, and was to prove consequential for relations with Washington.
The fact that Trump mentioned his role at least two dozen times was part of his effort to burnish his credentials as a ‘peacemaker’. Modi himself declared “no country had mediated in the ceasefire”.
By repudiating Trump, New Delhi antagonised the US president, injured his ego and hardened his position, when he was already railing against India’s trade policies and Russian links. It was also gratuitous as acknowledging that role would not have cost New Delhi much. It could still have reiterated its traditional opposition to any US mediation on Kashmir. The sudden warmth in US-Pakistan relations also angered New Delhi, making it more obdurate in giving Trump credit for defusing the crisis.
Three, New Delhi failed to read the geopolitical calculations of a man who was upending just about every aspect of American foreign policy, unencumbered by past dynamics. For Trump, India’s value as a ‘counterweight’ to China didn’t seem to count for much, especially as his transactional approach was focused on striking a grand bargain with China and not seeking endless confrontation. As Ed Luce put it in the Financial Times, Trump “is undoing quarter of century of US policy of shoring up India as a counterbalance to China”. On Russia, the Indian government did not foresee that, frustrated by President Vladimir Putin on a Ukraine ceasefire, the mercurial US president would flip and shift his stance, as well as harden his position on countries that traded with it. New Delhi’s old think proved an obstacle in understanding geopolitical changes, much less managing them.
This has left New Delhi in a bind and scrambling for a strategy to deal with Trump, who has little tolerance for India’s avowed ‘strategic autonomy’. It condemned the latest US move as “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable”. So far, the Modi government has responded by expressions of nationalist rhetoric, pushing back against the US by continuing to buy oil from Russia, saying it won’t compromise on farmers’ interests and stepping up engagement with China. India’s dilemma is that if it concedes on tariffs, it loses face at home and hands an advantage to the opposition that sees Trump’s actions as “economic blackmail”. If it doesn’t, it risks lasting damage both to its economy and relations with Washington. The US-India ‘strategic alignment’ faces an uncertain and troubled future, for now.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, August 11th, 2025
