For decades, conservatives, Islamists and populists in Pakistan have been launching tirades against ‘Westernisation’. Westernisation is the import and adoption of European culture, social and political ideas, and technology by non-Western societies. Interestingly, even though the US became perhaps the most active exporter of Westernisation after World War II, its own creation in the late 18th century was an outcome of Westernisation.
The US’ national and cultural identity were strongly influenced by European philosophy and history. Industrialisation in the US was significantly influenced by Britain, with early American industrial development largely based on British models and technologies.
Non-Western countries embraced Westernisation because it was linked to social, political and economic modernity and ‘progress’. It was closely linked to capitalism and democracy, even though many non-democratic regimes adopted it as well. But, by the late 1970s, critiques against Westernisation in non-Western regions began to find more space than before in the politics and intelligentsias of these regions. Westernisation started to be seen as a tool of ‘cultural imperialism’ and a cause of identity loss and the erosion of ‘traditional ways of life.’
For example, many Muslim-majority countries initiated projects to replace Westernisation’s economic, political and cultural products with ‘Islamic’ products. Ideas such as ‘Islamic constitutions’, ‘Islamic banking’, ‘Islamic science’ etc began being applied in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Such ‘Islamisation’ projects were an overarching response/reaction to Westernisation.
For decades, Pakistan’s political and cultural discourse has been framed as a struggle against ‘Westernisation’. But the real story is more complex — and China’s pragmatic approach to
Westernisation shows that modernisation need not be hostage to ideology or faith
But this did not mean the outright rejection of ‘Western’ technology — as long as it was applied in an ‘Islamic manner.’ Western cultural products too were not rejected, as long as they did not offend ‘Islamic sensibilities.’ The outcome of all this was a complex fusion that produced societies of co-existing contrasts. But in such societies, it actually became almost impossible to reach a convincing consensus on exactly what was ‘Islamic’ and what wasn’t.
Westernisation in various Muslim countries was systematically demonised, but its ‘modernisation’ aspects prevailed. On the one hand, modernisation was compartmentalised (or only made available to certain sections of the society), and, on the other hand, it was ‘Islamised’ (for the ‘masses’).
Additionally, ‘postmodernism’ as a collection of political, economic and cultural critiques comprehensively vilified Westernisation — even though postmodernism too was a product of the West. Postmodernism romanticised ‘localism’ and saw the world as an assemblage of islands with their own ‘ways of life.’
Yet, postmodernism also celebrated hybridity and the mixing of cultures, which gave credence to what became to be known as ‘globalisation’. This dual and often contradictory nature of postmodernism is present in many Muslim-majority regions. Contradictions can produce a constructive synthesis but, in this case, it mostly produced confusion and identity crises.
Westernisation is no more a troubling spectre, though. One adopts it as a necessity — even selectively. Many non-Western countries have begun to use Western technologies and economic ideas to further evolve them and call them their own. China is an excellent case in point.
From 1979 onwards, the Chinese adopted Western economic and cultural ideas and technologies by first fully understanding them and then tweaking them in an entirely pragmatic manner (instead of on the basis of an ideology or faith). There might be a Chinese system of banking, for example, but it’s not called Confucius or Maoist banking.
Anyone talking disparagingly about Westernisation in Pakistan vis-a-vis Islam is only deepening the confusion. If they are willing to look beyond this, they will notice that, from the 1980s onwards, the more alarming issue has been that of ‘Indianisation’. And this is due to how ‘Islamisation’ was concocted to supposedly stall Westernisation. Let me explain.
‘Islamisation’ projects not only produced a complex (and confusing) duality, they also triggered sectarian and ethnic polarisation, especially in multi-ethnic/multi-sectarian regions such as Pakistan. The country’s polity contains multiple ideas of ‘true Islam.’ State-backed ‘Islamisation’ projects created tensions because these may not be acceptable to certain sects and sub-sects and even to certain ethnic groups. This triggers tensions that weaken Pakistani nationalism and identity.
Indian cultural products such as Bollywood films, though first banned in Pakistan in 1965, were unofficially allowed to be watched at home on VCRs in the 1980s — ironically during a dictatorship that was busy constructing an ‘Islamisation’ project in the country. The dictatorship did this to push so-called ‘un-Islamic’/‘Western’ behaviour indoors (such as watching films, holding ‘dance parties’, drinking alcohol etc), as the dictatorship got busy ‘Islamising’ the outdoors.
Years later, those bothered by the resultant contradictory duality began to see India as some magical place of democracy, secularism, freedom and, of course, great films. As the ‘Islamised’ outdoors became a mere aesthetic exercise to appease anti-Westernisation crusaders, Indianisation began working as a middle path between Westernisation and ‘Islamisation’ for an increasing number of Pakistanis.
Intellectuals, advertising executives, commercial brands, artists and everyday folk began revering Indian cultural, academic and political content because Pakistan’s own content in this regard continued to be weighed down by ‘Islamisation’. However, eventually, India itself began to roll back its revered democracy and secularism, bringing exclusivist ideologies such as Hindutva to the surface. Also, India’s cultural products began taking a more crass, anti-Pakistan turn.
The consequential retreat of Indianisation in Pakistan has been painfully slow. But it is receding. However, its influence on anti-state ethnic and Islamist groups (both militant and political) has grown. They see India as their vessel through which they will achieve their goals.
To neutralise Indianisation, which has now taken a more sinister turn, Pakistan needs to engage with Westernisation as China has. It has to be a pragmatic engagement, based on economic and political requirements. The engagement needs to be free of any ideology or faith, though.
Published in Dawn, EOS, August 17th, 2025
