BEFORE we move on to actually discussing the ramifications of the Pakistan-Saudi mutual defence agreement let’s first thank the two men who helped make it possible, starting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose strategic blunder in May this year — fuelled by hubris, rabid nationalism and a gross overestimation of India’s capabilities — continues to be a gift that keeps on giving. For Pakistan, that is.
In launching his unprovoked attack on Pakistan and getting a bloody nose in return, he not only succeeded in puncturing India’s aura but also, crucially, showed the world that Pakistan’s military is very much capable of taking on a much larger adversary armed with the latest military tech from around the world. No one was more surprised by this than Pakistanis themselves.
Next, we should also thank Modi’s ally and ideological twin, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who — deep in the throes of an unquenchable bloodlust and feeling absolutely invincible — conducted air strikes in the capital of Qatar, purportedly to assassinate Hamas leaders who were meeting there.
While he did not achieve his stated objectives, he has almost certainly succeeded in making the Gulf states consider exactly what a US defence shield is worth, when it is ineffective in curbing Israeli aggression.
It has also certainly caused those states to consider that Israel’s expansionist agenda encompasses the entire region and not ‘just’ Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Here we see a perfect example of the application of the law of unintended consequences.
The pact reverses the drift between Islamabad and Riyadh.
This then starts a serious conversation about how to hedge against uncertainty in a world that is, and will remain, in serious strategic flux. And one way to do that is by means of bilateral, and perhaps even eventually multilateral and regional, security pacts.
The deal signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can thus be correctly seen in that context, and while it is in many ways a culmination of the decades-long relationship between the two states and was certainly in the works for some time, I have little doubt that the Israeli attacks on Doha added a very real sense of urgency.
What this pact also does is to reverse what had been a clear drift between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. We would do well to recall that Pakistan had previously resisted Saudi entreaties to join in their war against Yemen, and the refusal to do so had indeed soured relations to a considerable extent. This period also saw Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, move closer to India, to Pakistan’s detriment.
That this trend seems to be halting may also have to do with India’s very clear alliance with Israel — recently the Gaza genocide’s poster boy, Israeli minister Bezalel Smotrich, was in India to sign a bilateral treaty and Modi took over 24 hours to condemn the attacks on Doha, without once even naming Israel. While this does not entail any sort of actual break between the Gulf states and India, it should provoke a rethink.
Naturally there are some very real questions and concerns in Pakistan as to what this pact would actually entail. If India were to attack Pakistan again, would Saudi Arabia deploy its troops in defence of Pakistan?
To be frank, this is unlikely at best, and would not even be something Pakistan needs. What this pact will do, however, is raise the costs of any future aggression by India and complicate their strategic calculations. If the details of the pact are ambiguous, then that is by design.
Other voices in Pakistan are (habitually) asking whether this means that the country will once again become embroiled in ‘some-one else’s war’ and concerns are being raised as to whether the true target of this pact is Iran. Now, had this pact been signed a few years or even a few months ago, then this would have been a valid concern.
But with Iran no longer the existential threat it was considered to be by the Gulf states pre-Oct 7, 2023, and very clear signals of rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, this sort of thinking should be considered the concerns of a bygone era. It is worth noting that a few days before this pact was signed, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Iran’s Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in Riyadh.
As for the rest of the Gulf states, the pact provides a template for similar agreements. Qatar, given its close relations with Turkiye, could opt for a similar arrangement with Ankara, which then could also be extended to Pakistan.
Here, the real wild card is the UAE, which, with its destabilising tentacles spread as far afield as Libya and Sudan, will likely remain aloof, trusting in its close relations with Israel to keep the peace.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, September 22nd, 2025
