A WEEK later, the uncertainty continues, even as there are observations galore that temperatures have come down a bit. There have been calls and advice from allies and friends, to both Islamabad and New Delhi, suggesting talking instead of issuing threats and banging war drums. And not all advice can be ignored, as South Asians well know, especially from the Americans, who have a history of hand-holding South Asians through their stand-offs.
This is not all. On the Pakistani side, government officials are no longer publicly providing a countdown of when an attack is suspected, while the info minister is also boasting of victory of the bayania (a word which has made a smooth transition from the PTI-PML-N stage to the international one) in the tensions between the two neighbouring countries.
On the Indian side, too, some events suggest a de-escalation, or is being interpreted as such. The cabinet security committee meeting ended with the prime minister authorising freedom to the military to decide on the response. This was followed by another meeting which announced a caste survey, something the BJP had been resisting and the opposition party, the Congress had been asking for. Why the government would yield on such a key opposition demand, at this time, is intriguing. But this is still not reason enough to crack open the Rooh Afza on our side of the border.
The domestic fallout will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out.
Those noticing these subtle changes still think New Delhi will respond, even though it is increasingly recognised that the decision will not be an easy one, for there is the ever-present risk of escalation as well as the peril of it ending as it did during Pulwama with the downing of an Indian plane and the capture of a pilot. And while India did spin the release of the pilot as a victory, the incident was an embarrassing one for New Delhi. But despite this, there is domestic pressure to act — and such pressure means not just kinetic action but also action which is perceived as bigger and better than Pulwama.
And this is what Pakistan expects also. Balakot plus.
At the same time, the calculus for Pakistan is no less rigorous. Whatever India does, Pakistan has to respond to it, plus more, whatever that may be. After all, this is the objective the country has set for itself after Balakot, when its plan was to strike near a military target on the other side, illustrating that it had the capacity to cause damage and didn’t. But to its good luck, it downed a plane and captured a pilot.
However, in this war of ‘retaliation’ and more, neither side wants an escalation, which is not just possible but also capable of causing great destruction. Still, the one-upmanship the two sides have prepared their domestic audiences for has bound them in varying degrees.
And this aspect — the domestic fallout — will prove important in the near future as the crisis plays out. After all, one can safely say that compared to 2019, both Islamabad and New Delhi have weaker governments. And in case of a fallout, there will be a price to pay domestically.
It is worth noting that for many analysts, Pulwama provided the then BJP government with an edge in the coming election, as national security became an important issue, even sidelining economic issues. Of course, such ‘success’ creates its own expectations which is at play this time around with the media and public opinion expecting an equally strong response. In addition, even most of the Indian opposition has asked for it, promising to back Narendra Modi. But what if the response doesn’t prove to be enough? That the Indian government is aware of this is also clear from the ‘aggressive’ steps it is taking vis-à-vis the Indus Waters Treaty, for it is something which can successfully be marketed as an act of war. But whether this will prove enough to stave off the opposition’s criticism as the elections in Bihar approach remains to be seen. As it is, a Congress leader has criticised the government by brandishing a toy jet that had lemon and green chilies attached to it, as he commented that the Rafales were in the hangers with lemon and chilies hanging off them, rather than being used.
The situation in Pakistan is no different. Pulwama ended better for Pakistan than it did for India. Indeed, few remember the public mood once Balakot had been struck. There were considerable questions about how and why enemy planes had been able to enter Pakistan. It was seen as particularly provocative because it revived memories of the Osama bin Laden raid. The resentment mitigated only when the Indian plane was downed, turning the public mood to one of jubilation, so much so that few asked if the strike by Pakistan would have proved enough domestically had the planes not engaged with each other and ended in the capture of Abhinandan.
Six years later, the government is less popular and less secure. The lack of popularity also plagues the establishment. All this will add to the sense of pressure; the government can’t afford to come across as weaker in its military prowess in comparison to a rival government. Indeed, its response, when it comes, will be compared to the previous government and judged accordingly. And if the response appears to be lukewarm, it will have domestic repercussions.
Neither will it be the first time. Conflict and war have always had an impact on domestic politics in Pakistan, shaping the latter in ways that have left a long-lasting impact. And where the wars next doors in Afghanistan have helped military dictators by extending their longevity, those with India have claimed a scalp or two. It was the 1965 war which catapulted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to a leadership position as he criticised Ayub Khan’s handling of it. And more recently, Kargil eventually set off a series of events which ended with a military coup and later the removal of Musharraf. The costs of this impending conflict are high for the subcontinent but also for those ruling it.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, May 6th, 2025
