Over the last two decades, Pakistan has seen major legislative changes in the areas of gender-based violence and harassment. The legislative changes are remarkable in the context of deep patriarchy and parochialism that permeates Pakistan’s society and culture.
The legal developments are the product of a combination of factors, not least of which is a strong women’s rights movement that has consistently demanded that the state act to protect and promote the rights of women.
A frequent refrain in political and social commentary in Pakistan is that these laws, while transformative on paper, have not translated to actual change in the lives of women and girls because of poor implementation. Widespread incidents of violence against women at the home, workplace and public places persist. Women and girls who approach state institutions, such as police and courts, in the hope of some accountability for violence, confront patriarchal attitudes and corruption and inefficiency of state actors, leading to deep frustration and retraumatisation. Online spaces, where misogynist targeting of women and girls is rampant, amplify their insecurities.
Historically, feminism in Pakistan has relied heavily on the power of the law to promote gender justice. For much of Pakistan’s history, feminists formed alliances with state actors and institutions to achieve their goals. This was, in part, due to the state’s receptivity to demands for progressive laws and policies to promote the status of women.
Gen Ziaul Haq’s decade of rule over Pakistan from 1977-88 was an aberration, with long-standing impact. Zia initiated sweeping changes to laws as part of his ‘Islamisation’ campaign, which led to the detention of women on accusations of adultery and fornication, promoted impunity for sexual violence and threatened to demote them to second-class citizens. A women’s rights movement grew in response to Zia’s policies and devoted many years fighting against his regressive changes.
From resisting Gen Ziaul Haq’s regressive Hudood laws to having progressive anti-harassment and domestic violence legislation enacted, the women’s rights movement in Pakistan has achieved much. But for countless women, the gulf between the laws on paper and the realities on the ground remains wide. Does the strategy for gender justice need a rethink? Eos presents, with permission, an excerpt from the book Progressive Laws in Patriarchal Societies: Lessons from Pakistan, published by Bloomsbury…
The passage of gender progressive laws in recent years marks a dramatic shift in the state’s attitude to women’s rights, compared to Zia’s rule. Years after the passage of some of the gender progressive laws, however, their effective implementation remains a distant goal. Legislatures and some mainstream political parties may have affirmed their faith in gender equality, but pushing state machinery to meaningfully activate legislation is proving to be an immensely difficult task.
Given the disjuncture between gender progressive laws on the one hand and the lived experiences of women and girls in Pakistan on the other, the following question should be investigated closely: what are the barriers to enforcement of gender-progressive laws and what can be done to eliminate or, at least, reduce the barriers?
This is a crucial question for the women’s rights movement in Pakistan, which has adopted reform of legal frameworks as one of its central aims. While the women’s right movement that grew from the activism against Zia’s rule has premised its work on the assumption that a liberal democratic state will help advance the goal of gender equality, the current scenario casts doubt on the effectiveness of state power, even with gender-progressive laws in place, to meet feminist goals.
Assessing the obstacles to implementation is important for women rights activists to understand not only how law reform can be made more meaningful, but also to determine the extent to which they should prioritise law reform advocacy in their work.
MAIN ACTORS DRIVING LAW REFORM
A key force behind the passage of laws was a women’s rights movement that gained strength over the decades, particularly during the 1980s and beyond. Women legislators in elected parliaments gained strength in numbers after reserved seats were reinstated in 2002 and supported the demands of women’s rights activists. Pronouncements by the judiciary on the state’s responsibility to prevent and punish gender-based violence gave impetus to advocacy for legislative change. These factors led to fertile ground for the enactment of gender-progressive legislation.
ACTIVISTS AND NGOS
Until the 1980s, women’s rights activism in Pakistan met with a degree of benign accommodation by the state. Following the imposition of discriminatory laws by Zia, women’s rights activists adopted a confrontational stance towards the state and challenged its promotion of patriarchy and its ‘Islamisation’ agenda.
Zia notoriously imposed ‘Islamisation’ on laws and policies, and a crucial pillar of his project was to undermine women’s freedom and autonomy. He openly stated that women’s role should be confined in the home or ‘chadar chaar divari’ [veil and four walls]. He made extensive changes to criminal laws through the Hudood Ordinances.
One piece of legislation, the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, took rape provisions outside the Penal Code and placed them in purportedly Shariah-based laws that conflated rape with adultery, with the result that many women, including those who had in fact been raped, faced adultery trials that could lead to the death penalty. His government’s reforms to the Evidence Act 1872, to supposedly bring it in compliance with Shariah [Islamic law], stipulated that, in financial matters, a woman’s testimony is worth half that of a man’s.
This change was perceived as state-sponsored discrimination against women and the imposition of second-class status. It was met with strong resistance from women activists who, in February 1983, demonstrated outside the Lahore High Court and were confronted with police brutality, leading to the imprisonment of several women, some of whom went on to become leaders of the women’s movement that played a significant role in the resistance against Zia’s dictatorship.
Activists formed the Women’s Action Forum (WAF), a collective that advocated for the reversal of Gen Zia’s regressive legal measures. It comprised women lawyers, journalists and academics and established chapters in cities across the country. Activists in WAF simultaneously established and strengthened non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during the course of the 1980s, which lent institutional support to their advocacy agenda.
Shirkat Gah, an NGO formed in 1975-6, became a prominent voice in the struggle against the Zia regime and included activists such as Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed. The Aurat Foundation was formed in 1986 by Shahla Zia and Nigar Ahmed as a research and advocacy organisation focusing on the rights of women. Over the years, it developed legislative expertise and regularly issued analyses of laws, legal proposals and recommendations for legislative change. Aurat Foundation released a newsletter called Legislative Watch that monitored legislative advocacy and made recommendations for law reform.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan was founded in 1986 by leading lawyers and activists, including Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, and became a major force for advocacy for the rights of women and the research and documentation of human rights abuses.
With the end of Zia’s regime and the return of elected governments in 1988, the women’s movement pushed for state recognition of women’s equal status and a legal regime that guaranteed the equality of women. The 1990s saw the expansion of a nationally prominent women’s movement and women-led civil society organisations that directly interacted with and confronted state power to demand the repeal of Zia’s laws and the implementation of laws that protect women from patriarchal violence.
Western donors and the United Nations provided funding to these organisations, allowing some of them to expand rapidly to major cities across Pakistan. These organisations developed ties to a global human rights community and, in particular, the global women rights movement that achieved crucial gains in the international human rights system through the decades of the ’80s and ’90s. Benazir Bhutto attended the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. NGOs such as Shirkat Gah and Aurat Foundation participated in the conferences and also worked with the government to prepare conference reports.
The Pakistan government signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in 1996 in response to demands from WAF and other NGOs. Leading activists took roles in the United Nations human rights system, which enabled them to strengthen human rights norms globally and also enhanced the credibility of their domestic advocacy.
Jahangir was appointed a UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings and, then, freedom of religion. Jilani was appointed Special Representative to the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders. NGOs also developed ties to feminists in South Asia, becoming founding members of South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR). Shirkat Gah joined a network of Muslim feminists known as Women Living Under Muslim Laws, to share experiences of women living in Muslim countries and to advocate for law reform.
Women’s rights activists and NGOs used their resources to raise awareness around pervasive violence against women during the decade of the 1990s. They led vigorous agitations against the ‘honour’ killings of women, which were reported in the media and highlighted by activists. The case of Samia Sarwar, who was killed by her mother in the law offices of Jilani after Sarwar had left her husband and sought a divorce, received widespread media and international attention. It stoked the flames of outrage against increasing reports of women being murdered with impunity.
‘Honour’ killings were exonerated because of amendments to the Penal Code provisions on murder and assault brought about as a result of Zia’s push to ‘Islamise’ criminal laws. Known as Qisas and Diyat amendments, which were first introduced through an ordinance and then enacted by parliament in 1997, these legal changes made murder a ‘compoundable’ offence — one for which punishment in the form of imprisonment could be avoided if the heirs of the victim agreed to be compensated by the murderer.
Activists highlighted incidents of sexual violence and condemned the failure of the state to hold perpetrators accountable for these incidents. The NGO War Against Rape, founded in 1989, publicised incidents of sexual violence and provided aid and legal representation to survivors. Activism through the 1990s led to increased public awareness and societal condemnation of gender-based violence, paving the ground for legislative changes that were to come years later.
Activism in Pakistan was fuelled by the international women’s rights movement of the 1990s that made violence against women one of its central advocacy goals. “Violence against women (VAW)” became an established phrase, assuming an important role in the international human rights system. The concept incorporated the recognition that violence in both public and private spheres falls within the human rights obligations of governments.
The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights was a watershed moment for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action that emerged from the conference reflected the recognition that women have the right to be protected from violence in the private sphere. States acknowledged their responsibility to prevent and punish harms caused to women within the family and to address the harmful effects of traditional and customary practices.
The UN General Assembly passed a declaration in 1993, soon after the Vienna Convention, that recognised that violence against women “is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women.” The declaration explicitly covered violence occurring in private as well as public life.
In 1994, a UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was appointed who submitted annual reports to the UN General Assembly. These accomplishments of the international women rights movement reinforced the women’s movement in Pakistan against patriarchal violence, which gained strength through the 1990s and the first decade of the 20th century.
Activist fervour and donor-funded NGO agendas combined to lay the groundwork for criminal legislation on violence against women. The resistance of activists to gender-based violence and their inclination to hold the government accountable for its inaction met with the rights-based, law-reform-oriented priorities of NGOs, whose agendas were influenced by United Nations’ human rights norms and foreign donor priorities.
Resistance to the state, a hallmark of the 1980s activism, was tempered over a period of time to accommodate reformist agendas that found openings with Pakistan’s constitutional and legal framework to address patriarchal violence. Over time, activists and NGOs found allies in political parties and legislatures.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEGISLATORS
The return of civilian governance in the 1990s did not lead to a reversal of Zia’s regressive laws. Although much hope was placed in the first government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, it did not repeal the Zina Ordinances or discriminatory provisions in Zia’s law of evidence.
A former member of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and National Assembly, Dr Shahnaz Wazir Ali, notes that the PPP governments of the 1990s were continuously besieged by the military establishment and aggressive opposition within the parliament. In this environment, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP focused on political survival and could not afford to take on the religious right by repealing laws that were ascribed a religious justification.
The two tenures of Benazir Bhutto’s government (1988-1990 and 1993-96) did, however, create space for women activists and NGOs to advocate with legislators and government departments. Bhutto’s participation in the 1994 International Conference on Women and Development and the 1995 Beijing Conference signalled an openness to demands for gender equality and a willingness to engage with activists and NGOs.
In her second government, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto formed a Commission on the Inquiry of the Status of Women, which included lawyers and activists Asma Jahangir and Shahla Zia, and was chaired by a Supreme Court judge. The commission released its report in 1997, which gave comprehensive recommendations for political and legal reform in the areas of criminal laws, violence against women, family laws and political participation among others.
The recommendations in the area of criminal legislation included the repeal of Zia’s Hudood Ordinances. The commission’s report contained a chapter on the theme of Violence Against Women, which included a recommendation that “[s]pecific legislation on domestic violence by husbands or in-laws should be enacted” and that there “should be no mitigation of any sentence in any case of honour killing.” It also called for a law “making it mandatory for all employers to respond to and monitor incidents of violence and harassment in the workplace.”
The report also contained a chapter on ‘Institutionalisation’, which included recommendations on protection measures for persons vulnerable to violation. It called for shelters throughout the country that are “only protective and not custodial or reformatory.” The commission’s inquiry report included a set of recommendations on political participation. It recommended that 33 percent seats in both houses of parliament — the Senate and the National Assembly — be reserved for women, and that women in the reserved seats be elected directly.
In 1999, Pakistan’s short-lived experience with elected governments was cut short as another military leader, Gen Pervez Musharraf, came into power in a coup. Musharraf led the country until 2007. Unlike Pakistan’s previous military dictator, Musharraf made some attempts to portray a progressive outlook, including on issues of gender.
The most significant institutional reform during Musharraf’s years was the restoration of reserved seats for women in elected bodies. The 1973 Constitution provided five percent reserved seats for women in the National Assembly and provincial assemblies, but this provision lapsed in 1980. Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order of 2001 granted women 33 percent reserved seats at all three tiers of local government, and 17.5 percent in national and provincial legislative bodies.
This dramatically increased the representation of women in subsequently elected assemblies. Following the 2002 general elections, more than 70 women became members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly formed after the 2008 general elections had 76 women representatives (60 on reserved seats, and 16 on general seats).
National elections held in 2008 marked a return to civilian government, with the PPP emerging victorious in national elections after the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto. The PPP came to power with the most progressive agenda among mainstream parties on the issue of gender. Its origins in populist democracy in the 1970s as well as its leadership by Benazir, the first Muslim woman to lead a Muslim country, are among the factors that contributed to its progressive outlook and rhetoric on gender.
The party also formed a government in the province of Sindh. The provincial assemblies acquired greater legislative power following the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, which devolved more areas of governance from the federal government to the provinces.
With a critical mass of women legislators in the assemblies, the momentum for women’s rights and progressive legislation accelerated in the 2008-2013 period. This period also saw the first woman speaker of the National Assembly, Fahmida Mirza, who supported the women legislators in their efforts to bring progressive legislation to the floor. Women legislators formed cross-party alliances to pass these laws, using the Women Parliamentary Caucus as an important forum for discussion and debate on legislation. Civil society organisations also engaged with the caucus, providing crucial resources and support while lobbying for legislative measures.
National and provincial legislatures during this time passed a number of gender-progressive laws, including: the Protection against Harassment of Women in the Workplace Act 2010, the Acid Crime Prevention Act 2011, the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act 2013 and the Sindh Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 2013. This legislation was perceived to be ground-breaking, as it provided legal guarantees to women and girls of state protection against harassment, violence and traditional patriarchal norms in the private sphere of the home and the workplace.
The elected National Assembly completed its tenure and elections held in 2013 marked a shift in power to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), led by Nawaz Sharif. During its two tenures in the 1990s, the PML-N was no friend of the women’s movement or its causes. In his second stint in office (1997-99), Nawaz proposed a constitutional amendment that would give the federal government the power to enforce Shariah — a measure that was also strongly opposed by WAF, which saw it as an attempt to extend Zia’s ‘Islamisation’ agenda that would pave the way for more regressive legislation for women.
Sharif’s party’s attitude to women’s rights shifted somewhat when he took office in 2013. In 2016, the National Assembly made amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code that strengthened criminal penalties against rape and amended procedures for evidence collection in sexual assault cases.
The year 2016 also saw amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code that attempted to restrict the application of Qisas and Diyat provisions in the case of ‘honour’ killings against women — but, unfortunately, the amendments were not effective.
In 2016, the PML-N-dominated National Assembly passed the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (Peca), which contained criminal penalties for offending the “modesty of a natural person.” Free speech activists and journalists protested against the law that imposed draconian restrictions on online speech, but it was nonetheless enacted, while being portrayed as a law that would protect women in online spaces.
ASSESSING SUCCESS
These successes [towards law reform] nonetheless demand critical analysis and thorough assessment. This book attempts to critically assess the success attained by governance feminism in Pakistan in the legal recognition of many forms of violence against women and legislative enactments to introduce new criminal offences, enhance criminal penalties and establish protection mechanisms.
By tracing the background momentum that led to these changes, it considers why this particular solution — criminal regulation and accountability — gained more recognition than other potential approaches to tackle violence against women.
It looks at how the successes impacted the intended beneficiaries of these gains — women and girls who face patriarchal violence and how they attempted to utilise these legislative gains. It also sheds light on the costs of these gains, costs that may be incurred through both the failures of implementation as well as the successful utilisation of criminal law and processes as well as their failures.
Finally, it asks women rights activists in Pakistan who continue to raise concerns about gender-based violence to assess options for future advocacy. While working out how criminal justice-based approaches may be made more effective, they should also consider how approaches outside the criminal justice system may be explored and leveraged.
I suggest that these questions be answered not from a standpoint that idealises state power or an opposite perspective that rejects any emancipatory potential of state institutions. In fact, the evidence about the impact of gender-progressive laws illustrates that a superior framework rejects a state/non-state binary. Instead, it identifies elements of state power that can be harnessed to pursue feminist goals, while incorporating emancipatory activism that de-centres the punitive state.
Excerpted with permission from Progressive Laws in Patriarchal Societies: Lessons from Pakistan by Sara Malkani, published by Bloomsbury
The author is a lawyer based in Karachi
Published in Dawn, EOS, September 21st, 2025
